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The Place of History and Philosophy
in the Moral Reading of the
American Constitution
James E. Fleming*

I. Introduction
Ronald Dworkin has long recognized that the fundamental questions of “What is
the Constitution?” and “How should it be interpreted?” are the central questions
of ﬁdelity in constitutional interpretation.¹ From his ﬁrst book, Taking Rights
Seriously,² to his book, Freedom’s Law,³ Dworkin has argued that commitment to
interpretive ﬁdelity requires that we recognize that the Constitution embodies
abstract moral principles rather than laying down particular historical conceptions and that interpreting and applying those principles require fresh judgments
of political theory about how they are best understood. He now calls this interpretive strategy the “moral reading” of the Constitution. Yet, narrow originalists such
as Robert H. Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia have asserted a monopoly on concern for ﬁdelity in constitutional interpretation, claiming that ﬁdelity requires following the rules laid down by, or giving effect to the relatively speciﬁc original
understanding of, the framers and ratiﬁers of the Constitution.⁴ They have
* I prepared this essay for the conference, “Exploring Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald
Dworkin,” held at Princeton University on September 18, 2004. The essay is largely drawn from my
article, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1335 (1997), which I prepared for
a symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1247–1818 (1997), for which
Ronald Dworkin gave the keynote address.
¹ These questions of “What?” and “How?,” along with the question of “Who is to interpret?,” are
the basic interrogatives of constitutional interpretation. See W. F. Murphy et al., American
Constitutional Interpretation 17–20 (3d ed. 2003).
² R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 131–149 (1977) [hereinafter Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously].
³ R. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 1–38,
72–83 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Freedom’s Law]; see also R. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of
Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249 (1997), reprinted in
R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes 117 (2006).
⁴ See R. H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990);
A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997); A. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 849 (1989).
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Fleming.
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charged that constitutional theorists who reject these claims are “revisionists” who
disregard ﬁdelity, thereby subverting the Constitution. Dworkin has vigorously
and cogently punctured the narrow originalists’ pretensions to a monopoly on
ﬁdelity, arguing that commitment to ﬁdelity entails that we pursue integrity with
the moral reading of the Constitution and that they, the narrow originalists, are
the real “revisionists.”⁵
I shall analyze two strategies for responding to the narrow originalists’ claim to
a monopoly on ﬁdelity. Dworkin takes the ﬁrst: Turn the tables on the narrow
originalists. He argues that commitment to ﬁdelity entails the very approach that
they are at pains to insist it forbids, and prohibits the very approach that they
imperiously maintain it mandates. The second is taken by Bruce Ackerman and
Lawrence Lessig, to say nothing of Lessig’s sometime co-author, Cass R. Sunstein:
Beat the narrow originalists at their own game.⁶ Ackerman, Lessig, and Sunstein
advance ﬁdelity as synthesis and ﬁdelity as translation as “broad” or “soft” forms of
originalism that are superior, as conceptions of originalism, to narrow originalism.
What is “broad” or “soft” about their forms of originalism is that these theorists
conceive original understanding at a considerably higher level of abstraction than
do the narrow originalists.⁷ At the same time, they argue that the quest for ﬁdelity
requires that we reject Dworkin’s moral reading.⁸ Indeed, Lessig and Sunstein
⁵ Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 74–76; R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An
Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom 125–129 (1993) [hereinafter Dworkin, Life’s Dominion]. I take the term “integrity” from Dworkin’s conception of “law
as integrity.” See R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire 176–275 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law’s
Empire]. For an insightful analysis of Dworkin’s general conception of legal reasoning in relation to
ﬁdelity, see G. C. Keating, Fidelity to Pre-Existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1 (1993).
⁶ See B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991) [hereinafter Ackerman, We the
People]; B. Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1519 (1997); L. Lessig,
Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Constraint]; L. Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995); L. Lessig,
Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity]; L. Lessig & C. R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994); C. R. Sunstein, Legal
Reasoning and Political Conﬂict (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal Reasoning]. Other
works illustrating the emergence of a form of broad originalism include M. J. Perry, The
Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? (1994); M. S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern
American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995); W. M. Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782 (1995).
⁷ See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 6, at 171–182; B. Ackerman, Liberating
Abstraction, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1992).
⁸ For an example of Lessig’s rejection of Dworkin’s moral reading, see Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 6,
at 1259–1261. For an example of Sunstein’s rejection of Dworkin’s moral reading in favor of an alternative moral reading, see C. R. Sunstein, Earl Warren Is Dead, New Republic, May 13, 1996, at 35
(reviewing Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3). For Ackerman’s rejection of Dworkin’s “rights
foundationalism” in favor of his own conception of “dualist democracy,” see Ackerman, We the
People, supra note 6, at 6–16. For examples of interpretations of Ackerman’s work as an attempt to
develop a broad form of originalism, see Flaherty, supra note 6, at 579–590; J. E. Fleming, We the
Exceptional American People, 11 Const. Commentary 355, 369–370 (1994); F. Michelman, Law’s
Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1521–1523 (1988); S. Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 918, 933–934 (1992) (reviewing Ackerman, We the People, supra note 6).

History and Philosophy in Moral Reading of the Constitution

25

make the Borkish suggestion that Dworkin’s project is not one of ﬁdelity, but one
of improvement.⁹ Thus, the broad originalists attempt to develop an intermediate
theory between narrow originalism and the moral reading.
Dworkin argues that the search for an intermediate theory is pointless and that
the moral reading is the only coherent strategy for interpreting the Constitution.¹⁰
I shall explore the reasons for constitutional theorists’ resistance to the moral reading, and for their persistence in searching for an intermediate theory in the form
of a broad originalism. Dworkin offers one reason: They are in the grip of an
unfounded assumption, the “majoritarian premise,” which leads them to reject
the moral reading on democratic grounds. In Part II, I critique his analysis and,
more generally, assess his constitutional conception of democracy and his moral
reading as a substantive theory of the Constitution. Then, in Part III, I put forward a second reason, which centers on the idea of ﬁdelity: They are in the hold of
another problematic assumption, the “originalist premise,” which causes them to
reject the moral reading on “ﬁdelist” grounds. There I assess Dworkin’s moral
reading as a theory of constitutional interpretation. I contend that the broad originalists, like the narrow originalists, fundamentally misconceive ﬁdelity. The commitment to ﬁdelity to the Constitution entails, as Dworkin argues, that we should
interpret it so as to make it the best it can be.¹¹ But broad originalists such as
Lessig mistake this commitment to ﬁdelity as proof that Dworkin is an “inﬁdel.”¹²
Ironically, in the name of interpretive ﬁdelity, the broad originalists, like the narrow originalists, would enshrine an imperfect Constitution that does not deserve
our ﬁdelity. Only under the moral reading do we have much hope of interpreting
our imperfect Constitution in a manner that might deserve our ﬁdelity.¹³ Finally,
in Part IV, I suggest that the moral reading is a big tent, and urge liberal and progressive theorists who have resisted the moral reading in favor of questing for a
broad originalism to reconceive their work as coming within it: in particular, as
being in service of the moral reading by providing a ﬁrmer grounding for the
moral reading in ﬁt with historical materials than Dworkin has offered.
⁹ Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 11 n.35, 85 n.336.
¹⁰ Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 14, 18.
¹¹ Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 5, at 176–275; R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle
146–166 (1985) [hereinafter Dworkin, A Matter of Principle].
¹² Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 6, at 1260.
¹³ Elsewhere, I have characterized the constitutional theory that I develop, constitutional constructivism, as a “Constitution-perfecting theory,” as distinguished from a “process-perfecting theory.” See
J. E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy 4–5, 226–227
(2006). I mean “perfecting” in the sense of interpreting the Constitution with integrity so as to render
it a coherent whole, not in Monaghan’s caricatured sense of “Our perfect Constitution” as a perfect
liberal utopia. See H. P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 356 (1981).
Dworkin addresses the “perfect Constitution” objection, which is that his interpretations of the
Constitution always seem to have “happy endings” or “liberal endings.” Dworkin, Freedom’s Law,
supra note 3, at 36. He concedes that the Constitution is not perfect, for it does not protect “all the
important principles of political liberalism.” Id. Nonetheless, he argues that “[i]t is in the nature of
legal interpretation—not just but particularly constitutional interpretation—to aim at happy endings.” Id. at 38. In that sense, Dworkin’s moral reading is also a Constitution-perfecting theory.
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II. The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise: or, The
Moral Reading as a Substantive Theory of the Constitution
In Freedom’s Law, Dworkin argues that the moral reading of the Constitution is
more faithful than the originalist strategy is to the text of the Constitution and the
conception of democracy it presupposes. He contends that “the only substantial
objection to the moral reading, which takes the text seriously, is that it offends
democracy.”¹⁴ Moreover, he argues that constitutional lawyers and scholars who
make this objection are in the grip of an unfounded assumption, the “majoritarian
premise.”¹⁵ This is the assumption that the fundamental value or point of democracy is commitment to the goal of majority will. This premise undergirds a majoritarian conception of democracy that is not true to our scheme of government and
that indeed obscures the true character and importance of our system.¹⁶ As an
alternative, Dworkin offers a constitutional conception of democracy which conceives the fundamental point or value of democracy to be concern for the equal status of citizens.¹⁷ He then considers and rejects three arguments for the majoritarian
premise, which are rooted in liberty, equality, and community.¹⁸ I believe that
Dworkin’s arguments for the moral reading and against democratic objections
rooted in the majoritarian premise are sound. But I shall criticize his formulation of
a constitutional conception of democracy—or constitutional democracy—and his
own moral reading as a substantive theory of the Constitution.
First, Dworkin is right to lay bare and criticize the majoritarian premise and
the majoritarian conception of democracy that stems from it. For too long, that
premise and conception have hobbled constitutional theory by providing a misguided and misleading account of our constitutional scheme. They have driven
constitutional theorists to regard as deviant or anomalous certain integral features of that scheme. Most famously, that premise and conception underlie
Alexander M. Bickel’s anxious claim that judicial review is a “deviant institution”
that poses a “counter-majoritarian difﬁculty” in our democracy.¹⁹ Dworkin in
effect turns Bickel on his head,²⁰ for Dworkin’s formulation of the “majoritarian
premise” as an unfounded assumption is the inverted mirror image of Bickel’s
formulation of the “counter-majoritarian difﬁculty” as the root problem. On
Dworkin’s view, the fact that many constitutional theorists are obsessed with the
“counter-majoritarian difﬁculty” presents a serious problem, because it obscures
from them the true character of our system and prevents them from embracing
the moral reading.
¹⁴ Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 15.
¹⁵ Id. at 16.
¹⁶ Id. at 15–17.
¹⁷ Id. at 17–18.
¹⁸ Id. at 21–31.
¹⁹ A. M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics
16, 18 (2d ed. 1986).
²⁰ Similarly, Sunstein has suggested that Dworkin has stood Judge Learned Hand on his head. See
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 36.

History and Philosophy in Moral Reading of the Constitution

27

But Dworkin would be wrong to suggest—and I do not believe that he does
so—that all democratic objections to the moral reading, in particular those
advanced by the broad originalists, are rooted in the majoritarian premise and the
majoritarian conception of democracy. For example, Sunstein makes democratic
objections to Dworkin’s moral reading from the standpoint of his own nonmajoritarian conception of democracy—deliberative democracy—and of his less
abstract, more pragmatic conception of legal reasoning.²¹ Moreover, Sunstein
advances these objections through developing an alternative moral reading of the
Constitution, rather than rejecting completely the idea of a moral reading. This
form of criticism is presumably the type that Dworkin would welcome, for it
engages the idea of a moral reading rather than wholly rejecting it.²²
Secondly, Dworkin is correct in arguing that a constitutional conception of
democracy—or a conception of constitutional democracy—better ﬁts and justiﬁes our constitutional text and practice than does a majoritarian conception of
democracy. He is persuasive in contending that protection of, and respect for,
rights that are the conditions for moral membership in our political community
are themselves preconditions for the legitimacy of the outcomes of majoritarian
political processes.²³ Here Dworkin appears to have taken a page out of John Hart
Ely’s book, Democracy and Distrust,²⁴ in arguing for conceiving our rights as preconditions for the legitimacy or trustworthiness of democracy. But unlike Ely,
Dworkin would include, among the conditions of democracy, certain “substantive” rights such as moral independence, in addition to “procedural” rights like the
right to vote.²⁵
Dworkin is mostly right about what the conditions of moral membership in
our political community are. But the architecture of his constitutional theory is
problematic. I fear that Dworkin’s characterization of all of these substantive and
procedural rights as “democratic conditions” may lead to unnecessary trouble and
resistance. Many readers may resist his argument that substantive rights like moral
independence are “democratic conditions.” Even if they grant that both substantive and procedural rights must be protected for the outcomes of the majoritarian
political processes to be legitimate or trustworthy, they may suspect that he is
pulling a fast one, or making it too easy, or being too clever by packing all of
the rights that constrain majoritarian political processes into the “democratic conditions.”²⁶ To observe, as Dworkin might, that such readers’ objections seem to
²¹ See C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Partial
Constitution]; Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 6.
²² Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 38.
²³ Id. at 24; see Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, supra note 5, at 123.
²⁴ J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
²⁵ Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 24–26, 349 n.5. For Dworkin’s earlier critique of Ely,
see R. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469 (1981), reprinted in Dworkin,
A Matter of Principle, supra note 11, at 33 [hereinafter Dworkin, The Forum of Principle].
²⁶ L. G. Sager has made a similar critique of the architecture of Dworkin’s theory, although his
primary focus was on the theories of Ely, Ackerman, and Frank Michelman. See L. G. Sager,
The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 942–948 (1990) (criticizing Dworkin’s
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presuppose the unfounded majoritarian premise may be true, but unhelpful if the
aim is to persuade them to abandon it.
I believe that there is a more straightforward and plausible theoretical structure
through which to present conceptions of constitutional democracy like
Dworkin’s. Elsewhere, I criticize the architecture of constitutional theories such as
those of Ely and Sunstein, which attempt to frame or recast all of our basic liberties, both substantive and procedural, as preconditions for representative or deliberative democracy.²⁷ I argue instead for a constitutional constructivism,²⁸ a
conception of constitutional democracy with two fundamental themes: ﬁrst,
securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative democracy, to
enable citizens to apply their capacity for a conception of justice to deliberating
about the justice of basic institutions and social policies, and secondly, securing the
basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative autonomy, to enable citizens
to apply their capacity for a conception of the good to deliberating about and
deciding how to live their own lives. Together, these themes for securing constitutional democracy afford everyone the common and guaranteed status of free and
equal citizenship in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy.²⁹ (This conception has afﬁnities to Dworkin’s view that the fundamental point or value of our
scheme of government is concern for the equal status of citizens.)³⁰ I offer my
account, constitutional constructivism, as the guiding framework that best ﬁts
and justiﬁes our constitutional text and underlying constitutional order.³¹
Moreover, I contend elsewhere that there are good reasons for conceiving our
basic liberties in terms of securing the preconditions for deliberative democracy
and deliberative autonomy instead of framing them as, or reducing them into,
preconditions for democracy.³² The ﬁrst reason is prophylactic: Articulating a
constitutional constructivism with these two themes protects us against taking
“constitutive account”). In his recent book, Sager analyzes and criticizes Dworkin’s theory as being,
like Ely’s and Michelman’s theories, a “democratarian account.” L. G. Sager, Justice in
Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Practice 132–137 (2004) [hereinafter
Sager, Justice in Plainclothes].
²⁷ Fleming, supra note 13, at 4–5, 29–34, 43–51.
²⁸ I mean constitutional constructivism in two senses. First, I intend a general methodological
sense of constructivism, illustrated by Dworkin’s conception of constitutional interpretation as constructing schemes of principles that best ﬁt and justify our constitutional document and underlying
constitutional order as a whole. Dworkin originally put forth this conception by analogy to Rawls’s
conception of justiﬁcation in political philosophy as a quest for reﬂective equilibrium. Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 2, at 159–168. Secondly, I intend a speciﬁc substantive sense
of constructivism, exempliﬁed by John Rawls’s conception of the equal basic liberties in a
constitutional democracy such as our own as being grounded on a conception of citizens as free and
equal persons, together with a conception of society as a fair system of social cooperation. J. Rawls,
Political Liberalism (1993).
²⁹ Fleming, supra note 13, at 3–6, 61–74. I develop this theory by analogy to Rawls’s political
constructivism. See Rawls, supra note 28.
³⁰ See Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 17.
³¹ For examples of Dworkin’s formulations of the two dimensions of best interpretation, ﬁt and
justiﬁcation, see Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 5, at 239; Dworkin, A Matter of Principle,
supra note 11, at 143–145; Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 2, at 107.
³² Fleming, supra note 13, at 78–79.
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ﬂights from substance to process by recasting substantive liberties as procedural
liberties or neglecting them. The second, related reason is architectonic:
Presenting our basic liberties in these terms illustrates that the two fundamental
themes of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy are co-original and
of equal weight. The third, more general reason is heuristic: Articulating our basic
liberties through these two themes keeps in view that our constitutional scheme is
a dualist constitutional democracy, not a monist or majoritarian representative
democracy. A ﬁnal reason is elegance: the importance of being elegant (though
not too reductive) in constructing a constitutional theory. I originally advanced
these reasons for adopting the architecture of a constitutional constructivism with
the foregoing two themes as part of a critique of the architecture of processperfecting theories such as Ely’s and Sunstein’s, which recast our basic liberties,
substantive and procedural, as preconditions for representative democracy or
deliberative democracy, but they also apply with some force to the architecture of
Dworkin’s conception of such basic liberties as preconditions for democracy. That
is, the architecture of a constitutional theory with these two themes, which
together secure the preconditions for constitutional democracy, has these advantages over the architecture of Dworkin’s theory.
Thirdly, and most importantly—to make explicit what has been implicit in my
critique of the structure of Dworkin’s constitutional theory—Dworkin never has
developed a moral reading as a general substantive liberal theory of our
Constitution and underlying constitutional democracy. To be sure, he has written
powerfully and cogently about the major constitutional issues of the day, and has
done so from a coherent and consistent viewpoint. Indeed, no one has made
greater contributions to constitutional theory than Dworkin has. But Dworkin
has not worked up a comprehensive yet elegant account of our basic liberties and
constitutional essentials as a substantive theory to beat Ely’s and Sunstein’s
process-perfecting theories.
That has been my project over the past decade or so. I have sought to develop a
Constitution-perfecting theory as an alternative to the process-perfecting theories
advanced by Ely and Sunstein.³³ According to the latter theories, the
Constitution’s core commitment is democracy, and judicial review is justiﬁed
principally when the processes of democracy, and thus the political decisions
resulting from them, are undeserving of trust. Process-perfecting theories are
vulnerable to the criticism that they reject certain substantive liberties (such as
privacy, autonomy, liberty of conscience, and freedom of association) as anomalous in our scheme, except insofar as such liberties can be recast as procedural
preconditions for democracy. Yet process-perfecting theories persist, notwithstanding such criticisms, because no one has done for “substance” what Ely has
done for “process.” That is, no one has developed an alternative substantive
Constitution-perfecting theory—a theory that would reinforce not only the procedural liberties (those related to deliberative democracy) but also the substantive
³³ See id. at 4–5.
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liberties (those related to deliberative autonomy) embodied in our Constitution
and presupposed by our constitutional democracy—with the elegance and power
of Ely’s process-perfecting theory.
That is what my book, Securing Constitutional Democracy, aspires to do. I develop
a Constitution-perfecting theory that secures both the substantive liberties associated with deliberative autonomy and the procedural liberties associated with deliberative democracy as fundamental, without deriving the former from the latter or,
worse, failing to account for substantive liberties altogether. Unlike process theories, it provides a ﬁrm grounding for rights of privacy and autonomy, along with
liberty of conscience and freedom of association, as necessary to secure individual
freedom and to promote a diverse and vigorous civil society. My theory also shows
how basic liberties associated with personal autonomy, along with those related to
democratic participation, ﬁt together into a coherent scheme of basic liberties and
constitutional essentials that are integral to our constitutional democracy.
Finally, Dworkin is right to conceive courts as a “forum of principle,”³⁴ while
recognizing that legislatures and executives are also “guardians of principle.”³⁵
Some liberals and progressives, emphasizing Dworkin’s conception of courts as
“the forum of principle,” have criticized his theory for being too court-centered
and for ignoring “the Constitution outside the courts.”³⁶ That criticism, although
understandable, is plainly overstated. Dworkin has always made clear that legislatures, executives, and citizens also have responsibilities to interpret the
Constitution.³⁷ Sanford Levinson recognized this early on, and appropriately
interpreted Dworkin as a constitutional “protestant” instead of a court-centered
“catholic” on the question, “Who is to interpret the Constitution?”³⁸
Dworkin makes a nod in the direction of endorsing Lawrence G. Sager’s wellknown view that certain constitutional principles required by political justice are
judicially underenforced, yet nonetheless may impose afﬁrmative obligations outside the courts on legislatures, executives, and citizens generally to realize them
more fully.³⁹ Sager’s view is an important component of a full moral reading or
justice-seeking account of the Constitution. For it helps make sense of the evident
“thinness” or “moral shortfall” of constitutional law, while still offering a moral
³⁴ Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, supra note 25.
³⁵ Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 31.
³⁶ See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 6, at 59–60; Sunstein, Partial Constitution,
supra note 21, at 9, 145–146, 374 n.35.
³⁷ See Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 31.
³⁸ S. Levinson, “The Constitution” in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123, 141 (interpreting Dworkin as a constitutional “protestant” on the question “Who is to interpret the
Constitution?”); see S. Levinson, Constitutional Faith 42–44 (1988). Dworkin has also referred
to his approach on this question as a “protestant” approach. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note
5, at 190, 413.
³⁹ Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 33–34. For Sager’s view, see Sager, Justice in
Plainclothes, supra note 26; L. G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reﬂections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410 (1993); L. G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978).
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reading or justice-seeking account.⁴⁰ I would urge Dworkin to consider adopting
such a view. (Of course, many questions would remain concerning what is and
what is not judicially enforceable.) I believe that he could do so without undermining his arguments against the majoritarian premise.

III. The Moral Reading and the Originalist Premise: or, The
Moral Reading as a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation
Next, I shall consider another reason why the broad originalists have resisted the
moral reading, which centers on the idea of ﬁdelity: They are in the grip of what I
shall call the “originalist premise.” This is the assumption that originalism, rightly
conceived, is the best, or indeed the only, conception of ﬁdelity in constitutional
interpretation. On this view, ﬁdelity by deﬁnition, or at least as practiced in our
constitutional culture, must be concerned with following the original meaning of
the text, the original understanding of the framers and ratiﬁers, or the like. The
originalist premise leads to objections to the moral reading on the ground that it is
“nonoriginalist,” “revisionist,” or not “ﬁdelist.”
The originalist premise is expressed in its most extreme form by Bork, who
asserts that originalism is the only possible approach to constitutional interpretation that is faithful to the historic Constitution and consonant with the constitutional design. He rejects all other approaches, most especially those like
Dworkin’s, as “revisionist.”⁴¹ In recent years, the originalist premise has also been
manifested in the emerging strain of broad originalism in liberal and progressive
constitutional theory. For example, Lessig evidently takes the view that originalism, by deﬁnition, is the only method of ﬁdelity. Most strikingly, he has made the
Borkish assertion that Dworkin is an “inﬁdel,” and he and Sunstein have suggested that Dworkin does not even have a method of ﬁdelity.⁴² I believe that the
originalist premise, as much as the majoritarian premise, drives the broad originalists’ resistance to Dworkin’s moral reading.
In unpacking what I have loosely called the originalist premise, I shall examine
several reasons why some liberal and progressive constitutional theorists have
resisted Dworkin’s moral reading in favor of searching for an intermediate theory in
⁴⁰ For a justice-seeking account or moral reading of the Constitution that is thicker, or countenances less moral shortfall through judicial underenforcement than does Sager’s view, see S. A.
Barber, Welfare and the Constitution (2003); S. A. Barber, The Constitution of Judicial
Power (1993) [hereinafter Barber, Power]; S. A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means
(1984) [hereinafter Barber, Constitution]; S. A. Barber, Justice-Seeking Constitutionalism and Its
Critics, paper presented at the New York University School of Law Colloquium on Constitutional
Theory (Apr. 20, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on ﬁle with the author).
⁴¹ Bork, supra note 4, at 187–240. This is the obligatory footnote where I must acknowledge that
Raoul Berger is more extreme than Bork (or, for that matter, Scalia). See R. Berger, Government by
Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977).
⁴² Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 6, at 1260; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 11 n.35, 85 n.336.
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the form of a broad originalism. More generally, I discuss the reasons for the
emergence of this strain of broad originalism. I contend that none of these reasons
is a good reason for the broad originalists not to endorse the moral reading, properly conceived. My general stance is to support broad originalism to the extent that
its proponents undertake it in service of the moral reading, but to criticize it to the
extent that they believe it is sustainable as an alternative to the moral reading.

A. The Turns to History and to Text, History, and Structure
First, the broad originalists seek to reclaim history, and indeed the aspiration to
fidelity, from the narrow originalists. They believe that liberals and progressives
ignored or neglected history for so long that they practically ceded it to conservatives.⁴³
The broad originalists undertook the “turn to history” to show that their constitutional theories, aspirations, and ideals are ﬁrmly rooted in our constitutional history
and practice, and indeed provide a better account of our constitutional text and
tradition than do those of the conservative narrow originalists.
The liberal and progressive project of reclaiming history and ﬁdelity from
the narrow originalists is understandable and laudable. But it is understandable
and laudable if undertaken in service of the moral reading, not as an alternative
to it. This project would explain a turn to history, but not necessarily a turn to
originalism. They are not the same thing.⁴⁴ And it would explain a turn to
history in order to pursue an historically grounded moral reading. But it would
not necessarily explain a turn to history that turns away from the moral reading. The turn to history should not become an escape into history.⁴⁵ Why not
conceive the turn to history as doing “ﬁt” work in support of a liberal or progressive moral reading rather than as a broad form of originalism that rejects
the moral reading?
Secondly, more generally, these liberals and progressives aim to ground their
arguments in the text, history, and structure of the Constitution, and they believe
that a broad originalism is more promising along these lines than is the moral reading.⁴⁶ Some recite this trilogy of sources of constitutional meaning as if it were a
litany. Like the turn to history, the turn to text, history, and structure is an understandable and worthy project. Liberals and progressives should ﬁrmly ground their
⁴³ See L. Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 132–163 (1996).
⁴⁴ The major criticism I have of Kalman’s ﬁne book is that she seems to treat the turn to history
and the turn to originalism as if they were the same thing.
⁴⁵ See C. Woodard, Escape into History, N.Y. Times (Sept. 15, 1996), §7 (Book Review), at 33
(reviewing Kalman, supra note 43).
⁴⁶ Among the enthusiasts of text, history, and structure are Sunstein, Akhil Amar, and Jeffrey
Rosen. See Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 21, at 119–122; A. R. Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999); A. R. Amar & V. D. Amar, Is the Presidential
Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (1995); J. Rosen, A Womb with a View, New
Republic (June 14, 1993), at 35 (reviewing Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, supra note 5); “Life’s
Dominion”: An Exchange, New Republic (Sept. 6, 1993), at 43 (exchange between Dworkin and
Rosen concerning Rosen’s book review, supra).
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arguments in text, history, and structure, not to mention practice, tradition, and
culture. But this turn is not necessarily a turn to originalism and against the moral
reading. Indeed, recourse to structure in constitutional interpretation typically
involves drawing inferences from political theory, not merely recovering, translating, or extrapolating from the original meaning of the text.⁴⁷ The turn to text,
history, and structure becomes a turn against the moral reading only if its proponents claim to be elaborating text, history, and structure without making
recourse to political theory. Such a claim would be problematic and implausible.
Why, then, do the liberal and progressive enthusiasts of text, history, and structure
cast their arguments as broad originalist arguments rather than as arguments in
support of better grounding the moral reading?
Thirdly, I suggest that the answer to the question—Why have the turns to history
and to text, history, and structure become turns to broad originalism and against
the moral reading?—is to be found in considerations of litigation strategy or judgments about the types of arguments that are appropriate in our constitutional culture. The thought seems to be that our constitutional culture is largely originalist
(or positivist), and therefore that arguments in constitutional law, to be successful,
simply must be framed in an originalist mold. A view of this sort seems to animate
the work of broad originalists such as Ackerman, Lessig, and Akhil Amar. I have
heard a strong version of this view articulated roughly as follows: The only way that
liberals and progressives have any hope of persuading Justice Scalia to accept their
interpretations of the Constitution is to make originalist arguments.
To this view I have four responses. (1) The attempt to persuade Scalia that
ﬁdelity to the Constitution leads to any liberal or progressive conclusions is a fool’s
errand. There can be no serious doubt that Scalia’s mind is ideologically impervious to liberal or progressive constitutional arguments.⁴⁸ Worse yet, this attempt
disﬁgures and debases constitutional theory by causing theorists to recast their
arguments in a narrow originalist mold dictated by Scalia.
(2) It is telling that the greatest liberal constitutional theorist-litigator of our
time, Laurence H. Tribe, has not adapted his constitutional theory to such an
originalist litigation strategy. To be sure, he has eschewed grand theory, as if to say,
“no theorists here, just us common lawyers.” But his conception of constitutional
interpretation in his academic writing is much closer to Dworkin’s theory than to
the broad originalist views of Ackerman, Lessig, and Amar.⁴⁹
⁴⁷ For examples of accounts of inferences from structure that recognize this, see C. L. Black, Jr.,
Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969); W. F. Harris, II, The
Interpretable Constitution 144–158 (1993); Fleming, supra note 13, at 90–91 (furthering the
“unﬁnished business of Charles Black”).
⁴⁸ Notwithstanding possible appearances to the contrary, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989),
and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), cases in which Scalia supported stringent judicial
protection of freedom of speech, are not counterexamples. For instructive analyses of Scalia’s First
Amendment jurisprudence, as manifested in such decisions, see M. Tushnet, A Court Divided:
The Rehnquist Court and the Future of Constitutional Law 130–155 (2005).
⁴⁹ See L. H. Tribe & M. C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 17, 81–87 (1991); L. H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reﬂections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation,
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(3) Our constitutional culture is not as originalist as the broad originalists seem
to assume. It certainly requires constitutional lawyers and scholars to pay homage
to history and to ﬁt with historical materials, but that is not to say that it is originalist.⁵⁰ Originalism is an ism, a conservative ideology that emerged in reaction
against the Warren Court. Before Richard Nixon and Robert Bork launched
their attacks on the Warren Court, originalism as we know it did not exist.⁵¹
Constitutional interpretation in light of original understanding did exist, but
original understanding was regarded as merely one source of constitutional meaning among several, not a general theory of constitutional interpretation, much less
the exclusive legitimate theory. Indeed, history was regarded as secondary to, and
merely as extrinsic evidence of, the meaning of text and structure.⁵² Scholars
wrote about the “uses of history” in constitutional interpretation rather than contending that enforcing original understanding was the only defensible conception
of ﬁdelity.⁵³ Moreover, original understanding, especially at a relatively speciﬁc
level, was understood to be largely indeterminate and inconclusive. As Justice
Jackson famously put it in concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer:⁵⁴
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern
conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was
called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly
speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from
respected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel each other. And court
decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions
in the most narrow way.⁵⁵

Regrettably, many constitutional lawyers and scholars in recent years seem to
have lost sight of this great wisdom. It is important to note that Laura Kalman, in her
ﬁne intellectual history of recent constitutional theory, has practically suggested that
108 Harv. L. Rev. 1223 (1995) (criticizing the (broad originalist) theories of Ackerman and Amar);
L. H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063,
1072–1077 (1980), reprinted in L. H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 9 (1985) (retitled The
Pointless Flight from Substance) (criticizing Ely’s theory for taking a “pointless ﬂight from substance,”
just as Dworkin critiqued Ely’s theory for doing so, see Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, supra note
25). For a critique of the broad originalist theories of Ackerman and Lessig from a theoretical perspective similar to Tribe’s, see M. C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 Geo. L.J. 1765 (1997).
⁵⁰ The Senate’s rejection of the Bork nomination was at least in part a rejection of Bork’s narrow
originalism. See Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 276–286, 287–305.
⁵¹ W. W. Crosskey may be an exception, but he was roundly criticized as exceptional. See, e.g.,
H. M. Hart, Jr., Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1456 (1954) (reviewing
W. W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (1953)).
⁵² See J. tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 287 (1938).
⁵³ See C. A. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History (1969); J. G. Wofford, The
Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 502 (1964).
⁵⁴ 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
⁵⁵ Id. at 634–635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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the best professional historians know better than to be originalists, but that some
constitutional lawyers and scholars who have taken the turn to history do not.⁵⁶
(4) Finally, we should put the following question to the broad originalists: If
our constitutional culture is so originalist, why do so many originalists complain
that so many constitutional law cases and so many features of our constitutional
practice cannot be justiﬁed on the basis of originalism?⁵⁷ The answer is that our
constitutional culture is not as originalist as the broad originalists have supposed.
Or that its commitment to originalism is more honored in the breach than in the
observance. Or that Dworkin is right in arguing that “[s]o far as American lawyers
and judges follow any coherent strategy of interpreting the Constitution at all,
they already use the moral reading,” but that there is a confused “mismatch”
between the role of the moral reading, which is embedded in our constitutional
practice, and its reputation, which is that it is illegitimate.⁵⁸

B. The Celebration of “Fit” to the Exclusion of “Justiﬁcation”
Another reason why some liberal and progressive constitutional theorists resist the
moral reading and attempt to develop a broad originalism is that they believe that
Dworkin’s theory does not take history and “ﬁt” seriously enough, or that it suffers
from a “problem of ﬁt.”⁵⁹ Their objection has two aspects. In the ﬁrst place, they
claim, Dworkin does not do the concrete groundwork necessary to show that his
interpretations of the Constitution adequately ﬁt the historical materials including original understanding and precedents. In the ﬁnal analysis, they claim, he
will too readily reject as mistakes any historical materials that do not ﬁt his political theory. For both reasons, they are dubious about whether Dworkin’s theory, as
Dworkin himself practices it, actually constrains constitutional interpretation to
be faithful to anything other than his own liberal political theory.
In response, I would distinguish between Dworkin’s theory of ﬁdelity as
integrity with the moral reading and Dworkin’s own application of it, and urge:
“Do as Dworkin says, not as he does.” That is, I would argue that Dworkin’s theory of ﬁdelity as integrity is the best conception of ﬁdelity, but would concede that
Dworkin himself may not always satisfactorily do the ﬁt work that his own theory
⁵⁶ Kalman, supra note 43, at 167–190; see J. N. Rakove, Original Meanings 3–22 (1996);
J. Appleby, Constitutional Conventions, N.Y. Times (July 21, 1996), §7 (Book Review), at 20 (reviewing
Rakove, supra). But see Rakove, supra at 7 (criticizing Jackson for overstating the point in the passage
from Youngstown quoted in text).
⁵⁷ See Bork, supra note 4; H. P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 723 (1988). For a highly instructive analysis of the gap between originalist theory
and our constitutional practice, see Dorf, supra note 49.
⁵⁸ Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 2, 4.
⁵⁹ For a broad originalist claim that Dworkin does not take ﬁt seriously enough, see Flaherty,
supra note 6. For a positivist claim that Dworkin’s theory suffers from a “problem of ﬁt,” see A. J. Sebok,
The Insatiable Constitution, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 417 (1997). For a narrow originalist critique along
these lines, see M. W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on
Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269 (1997).
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calls for, or that he may do it too abstractly to satisfy these critics that he takes ﬁt as
seriously as he should. Dworkin’s splendid essays in constitutional theory in the
New York Review of Books may aggravate such concerns. He writes these essays in a
style designed to reach and persuade a larger audience of citizens, not in a technical style to demonstrate to constitutional lawyers and scholars that he has done his
historical homework. Ironically, to the extent that Dworkin has indeed become,
in T.M. Scanlon’s estimation, “our leading public philosopher,”⁶⁰ he may have
diminished the appeal of his theory and his work to some constitutional lawyers
and scholars. For in their view, his “public philosophy” may not provide a good
model for the kind of scholarship that shows the proper regard for the aspiration
to ﬁdelity, and that gives ﬁt as well as justiﬁcation its due.
Furthermore, some broad originalists evidently resist Dworkin’s moral reading
because they believe, as Bruce Ackerman once put it, that “ﬁt is everything.”⁶¹ To
state the matter in terms of Dworkin’s well-known argument that the best interpretation has two dimensions—ﬁt and justiﬁcation—they seem to believe that
ﬁdelity is purely a matter of ﬁt with historical materials, rather than also a matter
of justiﬁcation in political theory.⁶² Fit and history do have a role in the quest for
ﬁdelity to the Constitution, but a limited one. We should acknowledge the place
of history in constitutional interpretation—as a constraint that comes into play in
the dimension of ﬁt—but should keep it in its place. Broad originalists tend to
exaggerate the place of history and to give it a greater role than it deserves and than
it is capable of playing.
History is, can only be, and should only be a starting point in constitutional
interpretation. It has a threshold role, which is often not dispositive. In the dimension of ﬁt, history helps (or should help) screen out “off-the-wall” interpretations
or purely utopian interpretations, but often does not lead conclusively to any
interpretation, let alone the best interpretation. History usually provides a
foothold for competing interpretations or competing theories. It alone cannot
resolve the clash among these competing interpretations or competing theories.
Deciding which theory provides the best interpretation is not an historical matter
of reading more cases, tracts, or speeches or more scrupulously doing good professional history. To resolve the clash among competing interpretations or competing
theories, we must move beyond the threshold dimension of ﬁt to the dimension of
justiﬁcation. History rarely has anything useful, much less dispositive, to say at
that point.⁶³ In deciding which interpretation among competing acceptably
ﬁtting interpretations is most faithful to the Constitution, we must ask further
questions: Which interpretation provides the best justiﬁcation, which makes our
⁶⁰ T. M. Scanlon, Partisan for Life, N.Y. Rev. Books (July 15, 1993), at 45, 45 (reviewing
Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, supra note 5).
⁶¹ See Bruce Ackerman, Remarks at the New York University School of Law Colloquium on
Constitutional Theory, Nov. 16, 1993 (colloquy between Ackerman and Dworkin).
⁶² For Dworkin’s formulations of the two dimensions of best interpretation, ﬁt and justiﬁcation,
see sources cited supra in note 31.
⁶³ Indeed, as stated above, the best professional historians know better than to be originalists;
unfortunately, some constitutional lawyers and scholars do not. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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constitutional scheme the best it can be, which does it more credit, or which
answers better to our best aspirations as a people?⁶⁴ These questions are not those
of an “inﬁdel,” Lessig notwithstanding.⁶⁵ They are required by the quest for
ﬁdelity in the sense of honoring our aspirational principles, not merely following
our historical practices or the original meaning of the text.⁶⁶ And the commitment to ﬁdelity is an aspiration to the best interpretation of the Constitution, not
merely to best ﬁt with the historical materials or original meaning (or best translation of them). The view that ﬁdelity is merely a matter of ﬁt—or that “ﬁt is everything”—mistakenly assumes that the Constitution is deﬁned, and exhausted, by
the historical materials.
More generally, some broad originalists may resist the moral reading because
they believe that ﬁdelity requires following historical materials and eschewing
political theory. But broad originalists understand constitutional interpretation in
terms of “liberating abstraction,” or conceive original understanding at a relatively
high level of abstraction.⁶⁷ When they elaborate abstract original understanding,
they will ﬁnd that they are not able to do so purely as a matter of historical
research, translation, or extrapolation. Instead, they will have to do so as a matter
of—and through recourse to—bounded political theory.

IV. Reconceiving the Moral Reading as a Big Tent
The upshot of my analysis of the reasons why the broad originalists have resisted
the moral reading in favor of trying to develop an intermediate theory is that we
should conceive the moral reading as a big tent that can encompass broad originalist conceptions such as those of Ackerman, Sunstein, and perhaps even that of
Lessig. Broad originalists have employed the argumentative strategy of using Bork
and Scalia, on the one hand, and Dworkin, on the other, as rhetorical foils or
extremes against which to set up their arguments.⁶⁸ This strategy leads to the unfortunate results of caricaturing Dworkin’s arguments and, worse yet, obscuring similarities and common ground between the moral reading and broad originalism.
⁶⁴ See Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 3, at 8–11; Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 5,
at 176–275.
⁶⁵ Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 6, at 1260.
⁶⁶ For development of the idea that the Constitution embodies aspirational principles rather than
merely codifying historical practices, see Fleming, supra note 13, at 112–116, 226–227. For similar ideas,
see Barber, Power, supra note 40, at 60–61; Barber, Constitution, supra note 40, at 84–85; F. I.
Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in William J. Brennan, Jr.’s Constitutional
Thought, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1261, 1312–1320 (1991); Michelman, supra note 8, at 1496, 1514.
⁶⁷ See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 6, at 171–182; Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction,
supra note 7.
⁶⁸ Compare Ackerman, We the People, supra note 6, at 10–16 (criticizing Dworkin) with
B. Ackerman, Robert Bork’s Grand Inquisition, 99 Yale L.J. 1419 (1990) (reviewing and criticizing
Bork, supra note 4); compare Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 6, at 48–53 (criticizing
Dworkin) with Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 21, at 96–110 (criticizing Bork); see
also Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 6, at 1260 (“From the perspective of the two-step ﬁdelitist, both the
originalist [such as Scalia] and the Dworkinian are inﬁdels”).
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Again, I would urge the broad originalists to reconceive their projects as being in
support of the moral reading, not as offering alternatives to it. They can help by
providing ﬁrmer grounding than Dworkin has offered for the moral reading in ﬁt
with historical materials. (I do not mean to suggest that their own moral readings
are the same as Dworkin’s particular moral reading.) I shall close by giving three
reasons for embracing the moral reading, conceived as a big tent.
The ﬁrst reason is hortatory: The moral reading exhorts judges, elected ofﬁcials,
and citizens to reﬂect upon and deliberate about our deepest principles and highest aspirations as a people.⁶⁹ It does not command them to follow the authority of
the past. In a word, it rejects the authoritarianism of originalism, narrow or broad,
as inappropriate and unjustiﬁable in a constitutional democracy. As Christopher
L. Eisgruber points out, it is ironic if not absurd that originalists would impose the
“dead hand” of the past upon us in the name of popular sovereignty.⁷⁰ The moral
reading exhorts us to conceive ﬁdelity in terms of honoring our aspirational principles rather than merely following our historical practices and concrete original
understanding, which no doubt have fallen short of those principles. On this view,
ﬁdelity is not subservient fealty.
The second, related reason is critical: The moral reading encourages, indeed
requires, a reﬂective, critical attitude toward our history and practices rather than
enshrining them. It recognizes that our principles may ﬁt and justify most of our
practices or precedents but that they will criticize some of them for failing to live
up to our constitutional commitments to principles such as liberty and equality.⁷¹
Put another way, the moral reading does not confuse or conﬂate our principles
and traditions with our history, our aspirational principles with our historical
practices.⁷² Again, it recognizes that ﬁdelity to the Constitution requires honoring
our aspirational principles, not following our historical practices and concrete
original understanding. That is, ﬁdelity to the Constitution requires that we disregard or criticize certain aspects of our history and practices in order to be faithful
to the principles embodied in the Constitution.
The ﬁnal reason is justiﬁcatory: The moral reading, because it understands that
the quest for ﬁdelity in interpreting our imperfect Constitution exhorts us to
interpret it so as to make it the best it can be, offers hope that the Constitution
may deserve our ﬁdelity, or at least may be able to earn it. Ironically, despite their
pretensions to a monopoly on concern for ﬁdelity, the originalists would enshrine
an imperfect Constitution that does not deserve our ﬁdelity.⁷³
⁶⁹ I do not mean to imply that the moral reading necessarily requires completely theorized agreements. But see Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 6, at 48–53 (criticizing Dworkin’s grand,
abstract theorizing and calling instead for “incompletely theorized agreements”).
⁷⁰ C. L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional Justice, 65 Fordham L.
Rev. 1611, 1613–1617 (1997). See also C. L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001).
⁷¹ See Fleming, supra note 13, at 6, 98.
⁷² See id. at 227.
⁷³ Originalism, as an ism, has no ﬁrm footing in our constitutional culture, and it has no place there.
It is a species of authoritarianism that is antithetical to a free and equal citizenry. A regime of purportedly
dispositive original meanings is, at best, beside the point of constitutional interpretation and, at worst,
an authoritarian regime that is unﬁt to rule a free and equal people. For a similar view, see S. Freeman,
Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3 (1992).
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The moral reading frames questions of constitutional interpretation as matters
of principle, to be decided by reﬂection upon, and deliberation about, basic principles and constitutional essentials, not mainly as matters of history that have
largely been decided (at least abstractly) for us by our forebears who are long dead
and gone. It underwrites a constitutional discourse that makes recourse to questions of principle themselves rather than primarily to other people’s views on other
subjects in other contexts. And the moral reading makes for a better constitutional
citizenry, not to mention better interpretations of the Constitution. It does not
reduce us to poring over other people’s opinions concerning these questions, nor
does it require us to put our arguments in the mouths of people long dead and
gone or to dress up our arguments in their antiquated garb. In other words, it
underwrites a deliberative citizenry, not an authoritarian one.
Thanks to Ronald Dworkin’s monumental contributions to constitutional theory,
we can see this clearly.

